Fundamental Philosophy, Volume 2
Translated by Henry F. Brownson
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The opening
CHAPTER I. CURSORY VIEW OF SENSISM.
ON IDEAS.
CURSORY VIEW OF SENSISM.
1. Having spoken of sensations, we come now to ideas. We must, however, before making this transition, inquire if there be in our mind ought else than sensation, if all the inward phenomena which we experience be ought else than sensations transformed.
Man, when he rises from the sphere of sensations, from those phenomena which place him in relation with the external world, meets a new order of phenomena, of whose presence he is equally conscious. He cannot reflect upon sensations without being conscious of something more than sensation; nor on the recollection or the inward representation of sensations, without discovering something distinct both from the recollection and from the representation.
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About this edition
- The words
- Henry F. Brownson's English translation, copied word for word.
- Copied from
- Left out
- The source library's header, footer and license, in 6 places
- The title page and opening pages before chapter 1
- Printed running title repeated beneath the book heading. (2 blocks)
- Notes and pages added by translators, editors or publishers, in 2 places