The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan

15 chapters · about 11 h

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CHAPTER I SCIENCE, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

SCIENCE, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

WHAT is philosophy? It is not easy to give an exact definition of it, either by the nature of the problems discussed, or the results arrived at; for the problems are as many as there are sides of experience, and the results are none of them universally accepted. The clue to the nature of philosophy lies in the method pursued. Philosophy is obviously an intellectual attempt to deal with the nature of reality. In the words of Hegel, it is a thinking consideration of things. It is a systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality. This definition of philosophy distinguishes it from science on the one hand, and art and religion on the other.

Science aims at a systematic study of reality, but not of the whole of it. The philosopher as the spectator of all time and existence aims at giving a unified account of the world as a whole. The scientist concerns himself with aspects of reality and studies them in abstraction from the whole to which they belong. Philosophy contemplates experience as a whole and attempts to comprehend it under its scheme. But each science has its own special field and special problems to explore and investigate, and does not feel called upon to take up the whole field of reality for its problem. So it is generally said that science deals with abstractions and not with reality. This statement is true in more than one sense. The qualities studied by the several sciences do not exist separate from one another, but live in close and intimate union. The chemical constitution of an object which chemistry investigates is indissolubly blended with its physical properties which physics studies and its organic nature which physiology has in view. In the live reality, they do not exist separately though for purposes of science we view them as if they were separate. Again, science treats facts purely from the objective point of view, while philosophy treats them as items of experience in relation to the interests and aspirations of the thinking subject. Philosophy studies experience as a whole, as a subject-object relation, as the unity of things with the mind which is conscious of them. It cannot be said that philosophy is only an aggregate of the conclusions of sciences, in the sense that, as the several sciences deal with their bits, the mere assemblage of all these conclusions will constitute the nature of the whole. For in every object we have a whole vision besides the partial visions. There are properties of the whole as a whole, which are not considered by the partial views. For example, the questions, What does all our experience come to? Is there any ultimate purpose in the universe? are not touched by the sciences. We require a discipline which shall investigate the ultimate nature of reality, God, the highest good. We cannot piece together the conclusions of sciences and put down the product to philosophy. Nor again can philosophy be looked upon as the study of the highest abstractions common to all the sciences. It is the business of philosophy as the critic of the sciences to reconcile the conclusions of sciences. If the science of nature compels us to conclude that everything in nature acts according to law, and that the principle of mechanical necessity is supreme in the universe, then it comes into conflict with the science of ethics which takes ior granted the relative freedom of man. It is not possible for one part of our knowledge to conflict with another. Our intellectual house cannot be divided against itself. It becomes the function of philosophy to reconcile the conclusions of sciences by delimiting their spheres of validity. As the ultimate questions which arise when man exercises his mind, viz. the whence and the whither of things, are not considered by the sciences, we are sometimes told that sciences do not care to go to the roots of reality, but swim only in the surface phenomena. In their pursuits, they make assumptions without inquiry, which philosophy cannot do. Physics assumes that there is such a thing as self-dependent matter; geometry takes for granted space. Even philosophical sciences like logic and ethics postulate ideals of truth and goodness. It is the task of philosophy to find out how far the premises assumed by the sciences are valid. It asks whether matter and space are real or ideal. The postulates of sciences become the problems of philosophy. Philosophy must give a logical defence of every premise that it demands. It requires that every conclusion, before acceptance, shall be carefully considered and justified before the bar of reason. It starts with experience and builds its whole structure on its basis without the aid of uncritically assumed premises. This is what Kant means when he says that philosophy ought to be critical and not dogmatic. Scepticism is a better preparation for philosophy than dogmatism. When dogmatism holds that there are some conclusions which we may not question but must accept without inquiry or reason, scepticism rightly revolts against this attitude and condemns it as unphilosophical. Criticism is the breath and being of philosophy. Dogmatism is the enemy of truth and knowledge. We may be asked whether it is possible to philosophise without partial theories or suggestions. Of course not. But the theories we start with should not be theories which appeal to us on account of their serviceableness in extra-philosophical relations. They must be theories which are suggested by the facts and which claim to render experience intelligible. Philosophy cannot be carried on by mere logic: it has to depend on the constructive suggestions received from half-formed insight, intuition, etc. Philosophy as an interpretation of experience cannot spin out its theories by shutting itself in a dark room away from the world of experience. It looks at experience, takes note of the suggestions forced by it on the mind of man and confirms them as theories, if they possess the requisite explanatory value. While science is an intellectual attempt systematically to study facts, philosophy is deeper than science in that while science takes certain premises on faith, philosophy is under an obligation to prove everything that it requires. As philosophy goes to the root of the matter and thinks to the bitter end, it is more thoroughgoing than science in the intellectual spirit of inquiry. It is one with science in that it is not satisfied with the first appearances of things, but transcends the view of things as they immediately present themselves to us in perception and seeks to arrive at a deeper view of them through objective laws and principles. Philosophy assumes a scientific attitude towards the whole of human experience, and not merely to the positive facts extracted from mechanical science. It is because science is confined to facts which gravitate, and is unconcerned with deeper facts of life and experience, that sincere souls are misled into thinking that science is the enemy of philosophy and religion. The exclusive worship of the positive facts of science leads to what we may call scientific metaphysics, which is the worst kind of metaphysics.

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