Epictetus, His Morals, with Simplicius His Comment

ALL Things whatfoever may be divided into two Sorts i thofe that are, and thofe that are not within our own Power: Of the former Sort are our Opinions and Notions of Things; ^ our AfFeftions, our Defires, and our Averfions. And in Ihort, all our A(5lions of every Kind are in our own Power,

COMMENT,

HE calls thofe Things in our onvn Po’voer, which we our-, felves are Mafters of, and which depend purely upon our own Difpofal and Choice; as we commonly fay, any Thing is a Man’s own, which he is not beholden to any body elfe for; fo as that it fhould fall within the compafs of a fecond Perfon to grant or deny it, to permit or debar, or any way hinder him in the Enjoyment of it. Now fuch are the Motions and Operations of the Soul; they are born and bred within us, and owing folely to our own Judgment, and our own Choice; for indeed, it is not poffible for any thing without us to determine our Choice. The Qbjeff of our Choice, ’tis confefl, is very often fomething without us; but the y^B of it, and the Motions toward it, are intfrely our own, and within us. Such, for inftance^ are the particular Opinions we entertain, and the Judgments we make of Things; as that Riches, or Death, or the Hke, are Things in their own Nature, good, or evil, or indifferent. And, though we are often induced to take up this or that particular Opinion upon Trull, and from the Credit we give to what we hear other People fay of it j yet is not their Authority, or their Perfuafion of fuch abfolute efficacy, as that the Opinion fhould not ftill be our own. For at this rate, we fiiould make ourfelves as fenflefs Creatures as Parrots, who when they call for a Cup of Sack, know not v/hat they fay. If we be allowed then to think at all, the Opinion muft be our ov/n Adl and Deed; occafion’d, ’tis true, foraetimes by Things without us, and recommended and conveyed to us by the Infrrudions and Arguments of others j but not infufed fo mechanically, as that we fhould be purely paflive in the Cafe.